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The symposium on “South and East Asian perspectives on international law”
postulates that perspectives matter for the understanding, interpretation, and
application of international law. I agree, but would like to caution against throwing out
the baby with the bathwater by giving up the never-ending struggle for a bottom-up
universalisation of the international legal discourse.
Our scholarly approaches, arguments and assessments are value-loaded and
connect to underlying political and theoretical preferences which are in turn
influenced by our socialisation and training in a specific legal culture and simply by
our life experience. However, the acknowledgment (and even praise) of plurality
in scholarly approaches should not overtake the scholarly ideal of intersubjective
comprehensibility. Academic works aim, or at least should aim, for universal
intersubjective comprehensibility, allowing scholars with diverging geographical,
educational, or theoretical background to understand an argument or a research
finding. Given certain premises and a particular method, in principle anyone,
regardless of sex, nationality or religion should arrive at the same results. Global
intersubjectivity in turn requires a transnational academic legal discourse whose
participants accept that arguments are sound only if they are fit for universal
application. But of course the global inter-subjective comprehensibility and
replicability depends on the premises and methods, which have to be laid open and
discussed.
More pluralism within the international legal discourse is needed, because
international law aspires to be universal but carries a historical baggage of
Eurocentrism. This legacy can not simply be denied or erased but can be
acknoweldged and problematised. This process is in full swing. We are in a period
of a global change of order, in which the economic, political, military, and ideational
dominance of the West is challenged not only by the rising states of the so called
Global South and Asia but also by business enterprises, new regional organisations,
and criminal networks which unfold global action taking off from bases in various
regions of the world.
Because the international legal order “feeds on preconditions which itself cannot
guarantee” (as Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde said for the state), it is inevitably
affected by these changes. Usually the macro-transformation of the international
order is attributed to the ongoing redistribution and dispersion of political and
economic power. But it also results from intellectual and moral factors which differ
in the various regions of the world, ranging from resentment against “Western”
interference in the middle East and Asia, the perception of being left behind and lack
of prospects for a decent life in the global south to the fear of loosing privileges and
wealth by the inhabitants of rich industrial states. The power shifts and the traction of
- 1 -
anti-globalist ideas are likely to increase the ever-latent pressure on the universality
of international law. And if the international legal order feeds on preconditions which
itself cannot guarantee, this also means that international legal scholarship, too,
must come to grips with pre-conditions and side-conditions over which itself has no
control. Its methods must also react to changing environments.
The change of environment lies in the rise of nationalist and militant politicians in all
regions of the world, promoted by discontent with globalisation. These politicians
and their think-tanks have highjacked and twisted the insights generated by
postmodernism, social constructivism, and cultural studies, and are now applying
these insights and concepts for political ends which run counter to the the critical
camps’ emancipatory aspirations. The merry moral, cultural, and epistemical
relativism propagated by postmodernists has paved the way to the ‘post truth age’
or ‘post factual age’: The concept of culture has been hijacked by ethnonationalists.
The standpoint epistemology as developed notably by feminists has been mongrified
into ‘truthiness’. The problem of ‘speaking for others’ has been highjacked by
populist politicians who claim to represent ‘the people’. The critique of the scientific
values of objectivity and rationality has given the amunution to creationists and
deniers of climate change.
So the question of the day is how to overcome our intellectual vulnerability against
ethnonationalism and sovereigntism. How to secure the insight that our knowledge
is historically and culturally situated against the abuse of this insight by political
hardliners? A reapparaisal of the value and importance of an (at least procedural
and discursive) legal universalism might help. At this juncture, one could actively
embrace a culture-based moderate moral relativism as an appropriate attitude and
as a useful starting point for scholarly debates in our pluralist, divided, multi-cultural
world.
Utilising perspectivism and “situationality” (Outi Korhonen), scholars might modestly
contribute to the attempt to build a bottom-up legal universalism without plunging into
legal absolutism. Starting from the realist assumption that people can make moral
and learning experiences which force them to step out of the moral and epistemic
framework they are used to, symposia such as this one should provide a forum to
tease this out.
By highlighting different nationally (or regionally) impreigned approches,
scholars could problematise ‘epistemic nationalism’. With this I mean the twofold
phenomenon that international legal scholars often espouse positions which can
be linked to their prior education in their domestic legal system and/or which serve
the national interest. The first variant, thinking along one’s familiar legal tradition,
often occurs unconsciously, while the second variant, supporting one’s home
country, may happen deliberately or unwittingly. A parallel issue is the persistent
segregation of research institutions along national lines. It is for that reason, too, that
we nowadays doubt that the ‘invisible college of international lawyers’ as invoked by
Oscar Schachter in the 1970s is really a global college. It rather seems to be an elite
college of scholars of the developed world, a college in which academics from the
so-called Global South are relegated to the role of the eternal students.
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The exposure of the fragility of the universality of international legal scholarship
is apt to contribute to the constant work of building and rebuilding a universal
international law. For such an exposure, it is not desirable and not even possible that
scholars of international law clinically strip off their ‘national’ point of view. On the
contrary, scholars can and should proactively make use of their diverse national (and
political and cultural) background by enriching their scholarship with a comparative
perspective. The espousal of our national (or regional) Vorverständnis should
ultimately contribute to working towards the ideal of a universal body of norms.
Presupposing that the raison d’êtreo f international law is to govern relationships
between political actors dispersed on the entire globe and to provide a common
language and culture, international law must be universal (providing rules which
apply to all). The fulfilment of the said functions requires distinguishing sharply
between a welcome plurality of perspectives (including the possibility of diverging
interpretations) on the one hand, and an undesirable plurality of different rules for
different players even if these are similarly situated.
To take an example from the law on the use of force: The „unable or unwilling-
standard“ (for identifying states from whose territory terror attacks had been
launched and against which self-defensive action should then be allowed) would
be erosive in this sense. It can not be applied across the board. International order
would be destroyed if all States (and not only the powerful ones which arrogate
themelves the privilege to apply this standards against others). This means that the
unwilling-or-unable standard is not universalisable. It can only function as disciplining
weak states and as empowering a few states with the sufficient military capacities to
strike. Such a multi-class or two-speed model of international law may be acceptable
for marginal issues and as a temporary device allowing for experimentation on a
small scale but should not be allowed to affect core principles of international law,
because that would erode the quality of international law as a world-wide normative
system.
I submit that the aspiration to a discursive, procedural, and bottom-up universalism
in international legal scholarship is not logically or intrinsically a ‘false’ universalism
which merely camouflages particular interests. For sure, it is a historical fact that
such hegemonic camouflage has often occurred and continues to happen not only
in real international relations but also in scholarship # both in the discourse and in
its outside features, i.e. in the way careers are managed and projects are organised
and financed. However, a universal orientation is unavoidable if there is to be
international law at all.
Multiperspectivism is also distinct from espousing epistemic or moral relativism. It is
independent from, or neutral towards, what Karl Popper has called the framework-
theory and from the accompaniyng framework-relativism. The framework-theory
holds that there is no common denominator that guarantees the possibility of
neutral and objective meaning and value. No autonomous world of meaning and
values exists, but all systems are self-contained, self-referential and relative.
Therefore, legal thought, language, and judgement are determined by inescapable
epistemic, linguistic, cultural and moral frameworks. The gist here lies not in the
hardly deniable proposition that throughout history and geography we have a
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plurality of epistemic, normative, and cultural frameworks. The gist lies in the
assertion that these frameworks are incommensurable.
The symposium can be seen as an attempt to test the alleged incommensurability.
The contributions and responses could be seen as an exercise in intercultural
hermeneutics in which the conversation or “dialogue” between the legal material
(texts) and their readers (scholars) is explicitly loaded with the concept of culture
(including legal culture). The cultural distance can be revealed, described and
conveyed through interpretation. Intercultural hermeneutics thus presuppose,
search, find and enlarge the overlaps between different cultures and philosophies.
These overlaps make cross-cultural communication and understanding possible #
also on questions of international law.
Ultimately, such a project needs to be complemented by anthropological research
trying to ascertain the validity of moral norms empirically with a view to actual
moral attitudes of people. Empirical studies are helpful to shake and challenge
predispositions, but will do the job only if they are informed by a conceptual
framework which proactively foregrounds pluralism. On the basis of such a
conceptualisation and method, universalism would not be based on an a priori
reasoning, but it would be an ex post universalism based on empirical data.
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